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Abstract
We illustrate the analytical content of the global slack hypothesis in the context of a variant of the widely
used New Open-Economy Macro model of Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) under the assumptions of both
producer currency pricing and local currency pricing. The model predicts that the Phillips curve for domestic
CPI in￿ ation will be ￿ atter under most plausible parameterizations, the more important international trade
is to the domestic economy. The model also predicts that foreign output gaps will matter for in￿ ation
dynamics, along with the domestic output gap. We also show that the terms of trade gap can capture foreign
in￿ uences on domestic CPI in￿ ation in an open economy as well. When the Phillips curve includes the terms
of trade gap rather than the foreign output gap, the response of domestic in￿ ation to the domestic output
gap is the same as in the closed-economy case ceteris paribus. We also note the conceptual and statistical
di¢ culties of measuring the output gaps and suggest that measurement error bias can be a serious concern
in the estimation of the open-economy Phillips curve relationship with reduced-form regressions when global
slack is not actually observable.
JEL codes: E3, F4
Keywords: Global slack, open-economy Phillips curve, in￿ ation.
An earlier draft of this paper circulated under the title ￿A note on global determinants of in￿ation.￿ We thank Todd Clark,
Steve Kamin, Erasmus Kersting, Jaime Marquez, Erwan Quintin, Jason Saving and Jian Wang for comments on an earlier
draft, and Greg Johnson, Janet Koech and Patrick Roy for excellent research assistance. The views expressed in this paper
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I
n recent years, a number of policymakers have addressed the question of whether greater global economic
integration, or globalization, has had a signi￿cant impact on in￿ ation in the U.S. While there appears to
be broad agreement on the importance of globalization as a real phenomenon, there is less agreement on
what globalization means for in￿ ation developments and monetary policy in the U.S. This appears to be
due in part to the relative recentness, in some sense, of globalization, and in part to serious data limitations.
Basic economic theory suggests that globalization, which we will take as being synonymous with greater
openness to trade, capital and labor ￿ ows, should have a⁄ected in￿ ation. Speci￿cally, if we think of the
measured in￿ ation rate as having a trend and a cyclical component, there are sound reasons for thinking
that both have been a⁄ected by the greater openness of the U.S. economy.
First, globalization may have lowered the trend rate of in￿ ation by reducing the in￿ ation bias that arises
under discretionary policymaking. This is an argument that is most closely associated with Romer (1993)
and Rogo⁄ (2003), but it has been made by others as well.1 Globalization may also have had a permanent
one-time disin￿ ationary e⁄ect by increasing the competitive pressures faced by ￿rms and workers, although
whether and when that one-time e⁄ect is played out seems to be an open question. Second, globalization
may have altered the cyclical behavior of in￿ ation by changing the composition of the basket of goods
from which the aggregate price indexes are calculated￿ although it may also have an e⁄ect through other
channels￿ as suggested by the standard open-economy versions of the workhorse New Open-Economy Macro
model of Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002).
The ￿rst-order e⁄ects of greater openness, whether to trade, capital ￿ ows or labor, are on relative prices
and real returns. Whether these changes then have implications for in￿ ation, over the medium to long
term, depends very much on how monetary policy responds to these developments. Globalization does not
alter the fact that in￿ ation is ultimately determined by the actions of monetary policy makers. We will be
considering primarily the impact of globalization on the short-run trade-o⁄s that policymakers face between
in￿ ation and real economic activity over the business cycle.
We will employ an extension of the two-country model of Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) to derive a
benchmark speci￿cation for the open-economy Phillips curve that ￿ eshes out the content of the global slack
hypothesis. Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) make the assumption of producer currency pricing, which we
also adopt here. However, we will consider an alternative assumption about how ￿rms set prices in export
markets￿ local currency pricing￿ and explore how this extension alters the features of the open-economy
Phillips curve that emerges from our version of the Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) framework.
We use this variant of the New Open-Economy Macro model to illustrate two propositions about the
impact of globalization on in￿ ation dynamics. First, foreign slack does matter in this framework for the
short-run trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation and real variables. Moreover, under most plausible parameterizations
the coe¢ cient on domestic slack declines as the economy becomes more open￿ as the domestic basket of
goods includes a larger share of imports. Second, international relative prices (speci￿cally, the terms of
trade gap) can be su¢ cient to summarize the in￿ uence of foreign factors on domestic in￿ ation in this class
of models.
This last result ties in with an older literature on the Phillips curve that includes variables like import
and commodity prices on the right-hand side of Phillips curve regressions. When we use the terms of trade
gap to measure foreign in￿ uences, the theoretical coe¢ cient on domestic slack is exactly the same as in
the closed-economy Phillips curve. These propositions hold regardless of what we assume about how ￿rms
set their prices internationally, that is, whether they engage in producer currency pricing or local currency
pricing.
Finally, we use our variant of the New Open-Economy Macro model as a data generating process
(DGP) to evaluate the global slack hypothesis with simple OLS regressions. We ￿nd that conventional
backward-looking estimates of the Phillips curve relationship may result in coe¢ cient estimates that reject
the hypothesis that global slack matters for domestic in￿ ation even though both are related within the
context of the model. While this exercise does not prove that the global slack hypothesis is consistent
1See in particular the contributions of Bohn (1991), Hardouvelis (1992), Fischer (1998), Lane (1997), Obstfeld (1998) and
Evans (2007). All of these papers rely on some variant of the time consistency problem highlighted by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and elaborated in a model of monetary policymaking by Barro and Gordon (1983). Yet it is not clear how important
this problem is in practice. Some central bankers argue that simply being aware of the problem has made them less likely to
succumb to it. Indeed Blinder (1998) argues that it is hard to reconcile the argument that central banks have an inherent
in￿ation bias with the in￿ation performance in most industrialized countries since the 1980s. Second, the Barro and Gordon
(1983) analysis is conducted in a simple partial equilibrium setting. Extensions to a general equilibrium setting by Neiss (1999),
Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003a, 2003b) have found that an increase in a central bank￿ s incentive to engineer a surprise
in￿ation need not always result in higher in￿ation due to o⁄setting changes in the costs of in￿ation. The analyses of Neiss and
Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano are conducted in a closed-economy setting￿ it remains to be seen how their results translate














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
with the data, it suggests that some of the mixed results in the existing empirical literature may be due
to measurement error￿ as well as the result of misspeci￿cation, omitted-variable bias, etc.￿ indicating that
more work needs to be done to test the hypothesis more convincingly.
1. THE GLOBAL SLACK HYPOTHESIS
For the purpose of thinking about in￿ ation dynamics in an open-economy framework, the basic two-
country New Open-Economy Macro model of Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) has proven to be quite
in￿ uential. We work with a straightforward variant of that workhorse model here.2 We give a quick
qualitative review of its main building blocks now, but a full mathematical description of the model in its
￿rst principles can be found in Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5 in the appendix. We focus our discussion￿
unless otherwise noted￿ primarily on the aggregate supply side of the model and on the derivation of the
open-economy Phillips curve since our goal is to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of the global slack
hypothesis.
The New Open-Economy Macro Model
In the basic setup, there are two countries, designated Home (H) and Foreign (F). The notation for all
endogenous and exogenous variables of the model is summarized in Table A1 in the appendix. Home and
Foreign countries are populated by a mass of households n and 1 ￿ n, respectively. There is a continuum
of varieties of goods of mass n produced by Home, and a continuum of varieties of mass 1 ￿ n produced
by Foreign, each variety produced by a monopolistically competitive ￿rm with a linear-in-labor technology
that is subject to an aggregate (but country-speci￿c) productivity shock. Each ￿rm supplies the Home and
Foreign markets, international trade is assumed to be costless, and nominal exchange rates are allowed to
freely ￿ oat. All varieties produced are perishable￿ there are no consumer durables, intermediate goods, or
capital in this model.
The monopolistically competitive ￿rms set prices to maximize the present discounted value of their
pro￿ts subject to a Calvo (1983) pricing constraint and the commitment to supply all that is demanded
at a given price. We assume the degree of price stickiness implied by the Calvo contracts to be the same
in all markets and for all ￿rms. Firms set their prices in the currency of the country where production
takes place (producer currency pricing, or PCP), as in Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002). However, we also
investigate the possibility of ￿rms setting prices in the currency of the market into which they are selling
(local currency pricing, or LCP) and how that a⁄ects the Phillips curve relationship (see, e.g., Woodford
(2010)). Only when ￿rms set Calvo prices under LCP, deviations from the law of one price occur. Reselling
is precluded so that the optimal policy of price discrimination is not reversed by resellers exploiting the
cross-border arbitrage opportunities. We also abstract from considerations of outsourcing, ￿rm relocation,
and FDI in this framework. The problem of the ￿rms is described in Table A2 in the appendix.
Household preferences in each country are de￿ned over aggregate consumption and labor. Aggregate
consumption in each country is a composite of a domestically produced bundle of varieties and foreign-
produced bundle of varieties, which are assumed to be imperfect substitutes of each other. The bundle of
Home varieties that each Home and Foreign household consumes is assumed to be a composite of the mass
n of the Home-produced varieties, where these domestic varieties appear as imperfect substitutes of each
other as well. Similarly, the bundle of Foreign varieties is a composite of the mass 1 ￿ n of imperfectly
substitutable varieties produced in the Foreign country. We denote ￿ the share of the Home bundle of
varieties in the Home consumption basket and (1 ￿ ￿￿) the share of the Foreign bundle of varieties in the
Foreign basket.3
Households make consumption plans and labor supply decisions to maximize their lifetime expected
discounted utility, yielding demand functions for each variety of domestic and foreign goods, along with
standard intratemporal and intertemporal optimality conditions. Asset markets are assumed to be complete,
so households are able to share risks e¢ ciently within and across borders. Labor is homogenous and labor
markets are perfectly competitive but separate between the two countries.4 Hence, wages are equalized
2The exposition that follows draws heavily on the work of Mart￿nez-Garc￿a (2008).
3Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Woodford (2010)￿ among others￿ make the assumption that both countries are
of the same size (mass 1 each) and that their consumption baskets are identical, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿. In contrast, the benchmark model
discussed here allows for country size di⁄erences (where 0 < n < 1 splits a unit mass of households and varieties between
Home and Foreign) and for di⁄erences in the basket of consumption goods across countries (i.e., ￿ 6= ￿￿). Both countries are
otherwise symmetric in every respect.
4In contrast, Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) assume that households are monopolistically competitive suppliers of labor.
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within each country. The problem of the households is fully described in Table A3 in the appendix. There
is a limited role for ￿scal policy solely providing labor subsidies to ￿rms in order to counteract the mark-
up distortion that arises under monopolistic competition. The labor subsidies are, in turn, funded with a
lump-sum tax on households. The model is closed with the speci￿cation of a monetary policy rule in the
spirit of Taylor (1993). In line with most of the literature, we assume that discretionary movements of the
monetary policy instrument are captured as (country-speci￿c) random shocks to the Taylor rule. Table A4
in the appendix describes the monetary and ￿scal policy rules as well as the market clearing conditions and
the productivity and monetary shock processes.
Table 1 below collects the key structural parameters that will appear in the exposition of the open-
economy Phillips curve that follows. A full description of all the structural parameters of the model can be
found in Table A5 in the appendix.
Table 1
Structural parameters
Intertemporal discount factor 0 < ￿ < 1
Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution ￿ > 0
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply ’ > 0
Elast. of substitution between Home & Foreign bundles ￿ > 0
Share of Home goods in Home basket 0 < ￿ < 1
Share of Home goods in Foreign basket 0 < ￿￿< 1
Home population size, mass of Home varieties 0 < n < 1
Calvo price stickiness parameter 0 < ￿ < 1
Aggregate Supply and the Open-Economy Phillips Curve
To explore the ￿rst-order e⁄ects of shocks on the dynamics of the economy, we log-linearize the equi-
librium conditions of the model around the deterministic zero-in￿ ation steady state. We use the notation
b vt ￿ lnVt ￿ lnV to denote the log deviation of a variable Vt from its steady-state value V . Likewise,
we use the notation b v ￿ lnV t ￿ lnV to denote the deviation of the potential (or frictionless) value of an
endogenous variable Vt, which we denote V t, from its steady-state level V . While exogenous variables are
unchanged across model speci￿cations, the upper bar indicates that the endogenous variables are determined
by a frictionless variant of the model where prices are fully ￿ exible. The resulting allocation is the same as
under perfect competition since ￿scal policy is chosen optimally. The labor subsidy su¢ ces to eliminate the
markup distortion introduced by monopolistic competition at the ￿rm level, and it also ensures that the
deterministic steady state of the model is the same under either ￿ exible prices or nominal rigidities.
The log-linearized aggregate supply equation for the Home ￿rms selling in the Home market can be
written in a familiar form as
b ￿H
t = ￿Et(b ￿H
t+1) + ￿(c mct ￿ b pH
t ); (1)
where the composite parameter ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ is a function of the intertemporal discount factor, 0 < ￿ <
1, and the Calvo price stickiness parameter, 0 < ￿ < 1. The price subindex for the Home bundle of goods
is denoted by b pH
t , b ￿H
t ￿ b pH
t ￿ b pH
t￿1 is the corresponding in￿ ation rate, and c mct denotes Home marginal
costs. Equation (1) simpli￿es to the standard closed-economy Phillips curve when the consumption basket
consists solely of locally produced goods.
The log-linearized aggregate supply equation for the Foreign ￿rms selling in the Home market can be
written analogously as
b ￿F
t = ￿Et(b ￿F
t+1) + ￿(c mc￿
t ￿ b pF
t + b st); (2)
where b pF
t denotes the price subindex for the Foreign bundle of goods in the Home market, b ￿F
t ￿ b pF
t ￿b pF
t￿1 the
corresponding in￿ ation rate, c mc￿
t the Foreign marginal costs, and b st the nominal exchange rate. Substitution
of equations (1) and (2) into the log-linearized expression for the CPI in the Home country, i.e.,
b ￿t = ￿b ￿H
t + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿F
t ; (3)
then gives us that
b ￿t = ￿Et(b ￿t+1) + ￿[￿(c mct ￿ b pH
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)(c mc￿
t ￿ b pF
t + b st)]; (4)
where b ￿t ￿ b pt ￿ b pt￿1 is the rate of in￿ ation of the Home CPI and 0 < ￿ < 1 is the share of Home goods














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
It is purely forward-looking and relates Home CPI in￿ ation to expected future Home CPI in￿ ation and
a weighted average of domestic and foreign real marginal costs. By invoking additional assumptions on
the pricing behavior of ￿rms and other primitives of the model, it is possible to rewrite the open-economy
Phillips curve in terms of domestic and foreign output gaps.
The Phillips Curve Under Producer Currency Pricing
We build our benchmark model under the assumption of producer currency pricing (PCP), as in Clarida,
Gal￿, and Gertler (2002). Under that assumption, the law of one price holds and exchange rate pass-through
is complete, implying that b pH￿
t = b pH
t +b st and b pF￿
t = b pF
t +b st where b pH￿
t is the price subindex for the Home
bundle of goods in the Foreign country and b pF￿
t the price subindex for the Foreign bundle of goods in the
Foreign country. The expression for the open-economy Phillips curve in (4) can then be rewritten as
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿[￿(c mct ￿ b pH
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)(c mc￿
t ￿ b pF￿
t )]: (5)
The log-linearized real marginal cost functions for Home and Foreign ￿rms can be expressed as
c mct ￿ b pH
t = ￿b ct + ’b yt + (1 ￿ ￿) c tott ￿ (1 + ’)b at; (6)
c mc￿
t ￿ b pF￿
t = ￿b c￿
t + ’b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿c tott ￿ (1 + ’)b a￿
t; (7)
where we have made use of the labor market clearing conditions and de￿ned the terms of trade as c tott =
b pF
t ￿ b st ￿ b pH￿
t . When the law of one price holds in this framework, terms of trade can alternatively be
expressed as c tott = b pF
t ￿ b pH
t . We denote Home and Foreign consumption as b ct and b c￿
t, respectively, Home
and Foreign output as b yt and b y￿
t , and Home and Foreign productivity shocks as b at and b a￿
t. The inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is ￿ > 0, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is
’ > 0, the share allocated to the bundle of Home goods in the Home consumption basket is 0 < ￿ < 1, and
the share allocated to the bundle of Home goods in the Foreign consumption basket is 0 < ￿￿ < 1.
The potential (or frictionless) output of the Home and Foreign countries is de￿ned as the output level
that prevails whenever the monopolistic ￿rms set prices at their ￿ exible level in every period, i.e., whenever
c mct ￿ b p
H
t = 0 and c mc
￿
t ￿ b p
F￿
t = 0.5 Thus the log-linear pricing equations in the frictionless case can be
written as
0 = c mct ￿b p
H
t = ￿b ct + ’b yt + (1 ￿ ￿)c tott ￿ (1 + ’)b at; (8)




t = ￿b c
￿
t + ’b y
￿
t ￿ ￿￿c tott ￿ (1 + ’)b a￿
t; (9)
where all endogenous variables are the corresponding frictionless counterparts of those de￿ned before.
We can then use expressions (8) and (9) to rewrite the log-linearized real marginal cost functions in
equations (6) and (7) in gap form (in deviations from potential) as
c mct ￿ b pH
t = ￿(b ct ￿b ct) + ’b xt + (1 ￿ ￿)b zt; (10)
c mc￿
t ￿ b pF￿
t = ￿(b c￿
t ￿b c
￿
t) + ’b x￿
t ￿ ￿￿b zt: (11)
That is, the real marginal cost for domestic ￿rms can be written in terms of a domestic consumption gap
(deviation of consumption from its potential), (b ct ￿b ct), a domestic output gap (deviation of output from
its potential), b xt ￿ (b yt ￿ b yt), and a terms of trade gap (deviation of the terms of trade from its potential),
b zt ￿ (c tott ￿ c tott). Likewise, the real marginal cost for foreign producers can be written in terms of a foreign
consumption gap, (b c￿
t ￿b c
￿
t), a foreign output gap, b x￿
t ￿ (b y￿
t ￿b y
￿
t), and the terms of trade gap, b zt ￿ (c tott￿c tott).
Substitution back into equation (5) would then give us an expression relating Home CPI in￿ ation to
expected future CPI in￿ ation, domestic and foreign output gaps, domestic and foreign consumption gaps,
and the terms of trade gap. However, it is possible to simplify further and derive the open-economy Phillips
curve in a simpler form that relates domestic in￿ ation to measures of the domestic and foreign output gaps
5The price-setting rule under monopolistic competition and ￿exible prices is that prices must be equal to a markup over
marginal costs. The markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution across varieties, ￿ > 1, and time-invariant. We
add a labor subsidy to exactly o⁄set this markup distortion. Hence, prices become equal to (pre-subsidy) marginal costs as it
would be the case in a perfectly competitive environment under ￿exible prices. In any event, since the markup is constant, the
price-setting rule with or without a labor subsidy can be log-linearized around a deterministic steady state in terms of prices
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alone by rewriting the consumption gaps and terms of trade gap in each country in terms of the output
gaps. After much algebra (outlined in Mart￿nez-Garc￿a 2008) we obtain the following expressions for real
marginal costs in terms of output gaps alone:





































































where ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and foreign bundles of varieties, and
0 < n < 1 denotes the share of varieties produced at Home￿ as well as the Home population share. The
composite parameters ￿ and ￿￿ are de￿ned as ￿ ￿ n￿
n￿+(1￿n)￿￿ and ￿￿ ￿
n(1￿￿)
n(1￿￿)+(1￿n)(1￿￿￿), respectively.
Therefore, the real marginal costs in each country are tied to both domestic and foreign output gaps.
Hence, we observe that in an open-economy framework like ours the foreign output gap matters not just
for the determination of the marginal cost of foreign ￿rms (and, therefore, to capture the e⁄ects on the Home
CPI from import prices) but also for the determination of domestic marginal costs because: (a) domestic
￿rms do export their products abroad, so stronger foreign demand will force them to pay higher domestic
wages and face the prospect of higher marginal costs; and (b) variations in the terms of trade re￿ ecting the
relative strength of the domestic and foreign demand will also a⁄ect their exports and domestic market sales
and consequently their domestic labor costs. Naturally, the same can be said for the role of the domestic
output gap in the determination of foreign real marginal costs.
There are, however, conditions under which the real marginal cost function of each country can be
expressed in terms of the output gap of that country alone. That would be the case if the following two
restrictions on the structural parameters are satis￿ed simultaneously, i.e.,
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿ + 1
￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)




￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
￿￿ + (￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿ : (15)
Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Woodford (2010)￿ among others￿ assume that countries are of the
same size (i.e., n = 1
2 in the set-up of our model), and most notably impose the assumption of identical
consumption baskets in both countries, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿. Under the assumption of identical consumption baskets,
both restrictions would be satis￿ed for any value of the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
￿ > 0 as long as the elasticity of substitution between the home and foreign bundles of varieties ￿ is set to
1 (which implies that the consumption aggregator is of the Cobb￿ Douglas type).
We can express the real marginal costs under the assumption of identical consumption baskets (i.e.,
￿ = ￿￿) as



































If we also assume a Cobb￿ Douglas consumption aggregator (i.e., ￿ = 1), then the expressions in (16) and
(17) simplify to
c mct ￿ b pH
t = (’ + ￿)b xt; (18)
c mc￿
t ￿ b pF￿















































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
However, in the more general case where ￿ 6= ￿￿, the two parametric restrictions in (14) and (15) are satis￿ed
simultaneously only if ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 1, that is, only if the consumption aggregator is Cobb￿ Douglas and
the preferences on consumption are logarithmic.
We can use the expressions for real marginal costs in (12) and (13) to derive a more general characteri-
zation of the domestic Phillips curve for overall CPI in￿ ation in terms of domestic and foreign output gaps
alone. The dynamics of domestic CPI in￿ ation can then be expressed as
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿
￿



















(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
1
A; (21)
￿￿;x￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)’ + ￿
0
@
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (￿ ￿ 1






(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
1
A: (22)
Moreover, it is also the case that
￿￿;x + ￿￿;x￿ = ￿ + ’; (23)
which is what the slope of the Phillips curve would be in the closed-economy case (whenever ￿ = 1 and
￿￿ = 0). Hence, when the domestic economy is open to the rest of the world, the concept of slack that is
most relevant for thinking about short-run trade-o⁄s between domestic in￿ ation and real economic activity
is global rather than local. That is the core message of the global slack hypothesis that we are sketching
here.
The Phillips Curve Under Local Currency Pricing
One has to wonder to what extent our results so far are a⁄ected by the shared assumption with Clarida,
Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) that ￿rms behave under producer currency pricing (PCP). A natural extension is
to consider the alternative assumption of local currency pricing (LCP) (as, e.g., in Woodford 2010), where
￿rms set prices in the currency of the market where they sell their products. Further elaboration on the
aggregate supply side of the model shows that the rationale of the global slack hypothesis within the context
of this framework is not fundamentally altered by these assumptions about pricing, with one major caveat.
The assumption of LCP in combination with price stickiness implies that the law of one price no longer
holds, and those deviations of the law of one price have to be accounted for in the speci￿cation of the Phillips
curve.
Under the alternative LCP price-setting assumption that we are considering now, the general expression
for the open-economy Phillips curve in (4) can be rewritten in terms of real marginal costs (de￿ned from
the point of view of the producers) as follows:
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿[￿(c mct ￿ b pH
t ) + (1 ￿ ￿)(c mc￿
t ￿ b pF￿





b st + b pF￿
t ￿ b pF
t
￿
measures the deviations from the law of one price for foreign-produced goods.
Similarly, we de￿ne the deviations from the law of one price for domestically produced goods as b dt ￿ ￿
b pH




The log-linearized expressions for the real marginal costs under the LCP assumption are
c mct ￿ b pH
t = ￿b ct + ’b yt + (1 ￿ ￿) c tott ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) b dt ￿ (1 + ’)b at; (25)
c mc￿
t ￿ b pF￿
t = ￿b c￿
t + ’b y￿
t ￿ ￿￿c tott ￿ ￿￿b d￿
t ￿ (1 + ’)b a￿
t: (26)
The terms of trade are still de￿ned as c tott = b pF
t ￿ b st ￿ b pH￿
t but are no longer equal to b pF
t ￿ b pH
t as in the
PCP case because the law of one price does not hold under LCP. As before, the potential (or frictionless)
level of output of the Home and Foreign countries is de￿ned as the output level that prevails whenever the
monopolistic ￿rms price according to c mct ￿b p
H




t = 0. This gives us the following pair of
equations to characterize the frictionless allocation:
0 = ￿b ct + ’b yt + (1 ￿ ￿) c tott ￿ (1 + ’)b at; (27)
0 = ￿b c
￿
t + ’b y
￿
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which are identical to (8) and (9) since the law of one price holds whenever prices are fully ￿ exible, i.e.,
b dt = b d
￿
t = 0.
We can use the relationships implied by (27) and (28) to rewrite the expressions for real marginal costs
in (25) and (26) in terms of gaps as
c mct ￿ b pH
t = ￿
￿
b ct ￿b ct
￿
+ ’b xt + (1 ￿ ￿)b zt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) b dt; (29)
c mc￿









t ￿ ￿￿b zt ￿ ￿￿b d￿
t; (30)
where the domestic consumption gap is (b ct￿b ct), the foreign consumption gap is (b c￿
t ￿b c
￿
t), while the domestic
output gap is de￿ned as b xt ￿ (b yt ￿ b yt), the foreign output gap as b x￿
t ￿ (b y￿
t ￿ b y
￿
t), and the terms of trade
gap as b zt ￿ (c tott ￿ c tott). Note that these equations are identical to equations (10) and (11), except for the
presence of the terms b dt and b d￿
t capturing the deviations from the law of one price.
Working from these equations, we can rewrite the open-economy Phillips curve in terms of (domestic
and foreign) output gaps and the real exchange rate (net of terms of trade e⁄ects) as
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿[￿￿;xb xt + ￿￿;x￿b x￿
t ￿ ￿￿;rp(b rst ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿) c tott)]; (31)
where the coe¢ cients on the Home and Foreign output gaps ￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿ are the same ones derived in
(21) and (22), while the new composite coe¢ cient, ￿￿;rp, is de￿ned as
￿￿;rp ￿
8
> > > > > > <
















; if ￿ 6= ￿￿;
or
￿(1 ￿ n); if ￿ = ￿￿:
(32)
Imposing the assumption of identical consumption baskets (as in Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler 2002 and
Woodford 2010), i.e., ￿ = ￿￿, su¢ ces to ensure that the real exchange rate alone accounts for the deviations
from the law of one price without having to subtract the e⁄ect of terms of trade. The composite coe¢ cients
￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿ would then be obtained as special cases of (21) and (22) under the assumption of identical
consumption baskets, while ￿￿;rp is a function of the Foreign economy￿ s size 0 < (1 ￿ n) < 1 as noted in
(32). All of which re￿ ects that the real exchange rate moves with deviations of the law of one price, but
also due to di⁄erences in the composition of the consumption basket across countries. Movements in the
real exchange rate tied to compositional di⁄erences are, in turn, well known to be proportional to the terms
of trade (see, e.g., Mart￿nez-Garc￿a 2008).
Once we account for the e⁄ect of deviations of the law of one price on the open-economy Phillips curve,
we observe that Home and Foreign output gaps enter into the speci￿cation in (31) in the same way as they
did in (20). In fact, the only di⁄erence with the Phillips curve that we derived under the PCP assumption
is the presence of a term involving the real exchange rate (net of terms of trade e⁄ects), whose role is to
account for the impact of deviations from the law of one price.
The Phillips Curve Under a Hybrid Case







+ ￿[￿￿;xb xt + ￿￿;x￿b x￿
t]; (33)







+ ￿[￿￿;xb xt + ￿￿;x￿b x￿
t ￿ ￿￿;rp(b rst ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿) c tott)]: (34)
It naturally follows from here that a convex combination with a positive mass of PCP ￿rms and LCP ￿rms
can be derived from expressions (33) and (34). Let us assume that a common across countries￿ constant
and exogenous￿ fraction of ￿rms 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 prices according to the LCP rule, while a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ prices
according to the PCP rule. Then, Home CPI in￿ ation will be determined as
b ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿PCP















































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
with the open-economy Phillips curve being
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿[￿￿;xb xt + ￿￿;x￿b x￿
t ￿ ￿￿￿;rp(b rst ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿) c tott)]: (36)
While this approximation has its conceptual limitations, it is useful in the sense that it suggests that
deviations from the law of one price as captured in international relative prices (the real exchange rate net
of terms of trade e⁄ects) should be taken into account in the open-economy Phillips curve even if not all
￿rms set prices according to the LCP assumption. If the empirical evidence strongly indicates that ￿rms
conform to the PCP rule (the implicit assumption in Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler 2002), then deviations of
the law of one price become a negligible concern and international relative prices are redundant. In either
case, the interpretation of the slope coe¢ cients on the output gaps remains unchanged.
Discussion
The coe¢ cients on the output gap terms de￿ned in (21) and (22) are identical under producer currency
pricing (PCP) as illustrated by the domestic Phillips curve in (20), under local currency pricing (LCP) as
shown in the Phillips curve in (31), or in a hybrid case that can be approximated as a convex combination
of the PCP and LCP cases as in (36). Our analysis of the slope of the open-economy Phillips curve on the
output gaps allows us to conclude that the following three propositions are robust to the assumptions made
about the currency in which exports are to be priced:
First, the output gap in the Foreign country, as measured by the deviation of foreign output from its
potential (or frictionless) level, matters for domestic CPI in￿ ation. In other words, we argue that the global
slack hypothesis has analytical content￿ even under a ￿ oating exchange rate regime￿ in the context of the
widely used New Open-Economy Macro framework for thinking about short-run in￿ ation trade-o⁄s in open
economies.
Second, in the special case investigated by Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Woodford (2010) where
the consumption baskets are identical across countries, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿, there is no ambiguity about the positive
sign of the coe¢ cients ￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿ in (21) and (22).6 In general, the signs of the coe¢ cients on the
domestic and foreign output gaps will not always be positive across all possible combinations of values in the
parameter space. In the appendix we explore in greater detail some parameterizations of the model under
which either coe¢ cient can become negative and show that for most (but not all) the coe¢ cients ￿￿;x and
￿￿;x￿ will be positive. We also note that both coe¢ cients cannot be negative at the same time and that a
necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the coe¢ cient on the foreign output gap ￿￿;x￿ to turn negative
is that the share of Home goods be larger in the Home consumption basket than in the Foreign basket, i.e.,
￿ > ￿￿.
Third, in the special case where the consumption baskets are identical across countries, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿,
the Phillips curve will be ￿ atter relative to the domestic output gap (and steeper relative to the foreign
output gap) the more important are Foreign goods in the Home consumption basket and in the Foreign
consumption basket (i.e., the higher (1 ￿ ￿) and (1 ￿ ￿￿) are).7 In the appendix we explore in greater detail
the parameterizations of the model under which the partial derivative
@￿￿;x￿
@￿ ￿ computed while keeping
￿￿ unchanged￿ can turn positive, and we show that for most plausible values of the parameter space this
partial derivative will be negative. We also note that the partial derivative of the composite coe¢ cient




@￿ . Therefore, under most conventional
parameterizations, we ￿nd that the Phillips curve should become ￿ atter relative to the domestic output
gap (and steeper relative to the foreign output gap), the more important are Foreign goods in the Home
consumption basket (i.e., the higher (1 ￿ ￿) is).
In the appendix we also investigate the parameterizations of the model under which the partial derivative
@￿￿;x￿







@￿￿ can be either positive or negative for most reasonable parameterizations of the model
depending on the initial degree of openness of both economies as measured by the shares ￿ and ￿￿.
It is often thought that the key parameter determining the quantitative importance of foreign factors
on the domestic Home Phillips curve in this and other related models is the share of Foreign goods in the
6It must be noted that the slopes on the output gap terms in the Phillips curve are not only determined by the coe¢ cients
￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿, but also by ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿ > 0. However, the latter term does not depend on the shares of imported goods
in the consumption basket of each country. In other words, ￿ is a scaling factor that a⁄ects the absolute value, but not the
sign of the coe¢ cients on the output gaps.
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Home consumption basket, (1 ￿ ￿). It is then argued that given the composition of the consumption basket
of the representative U.S. household, and speci￿cally the fact that it seems to be heavily skewed toward
goods and services that are either nontraded or nontradable, this puts a signi￿cant limit on how important,
in a quantitative sense, foreign slack is likely to be for U.S. in￿ ation. While the share of imports of goods
and services over U.S. GDP has increased from just over 4 percent to more than 18 percent at the recent
peak, international trade in goods and services remains a lot less important for the U.S. economy than for
many other economies.
We think such an argument needs to be quali￿ed in light of our ￿ndings. Our analysis suggests that
another crucial parameter in determining the slope of the open-economy Phillips curve on domestic and
foreign output gaps is the share of Home goods in the Foreign consumption basket, ￿￿. The sign of the
partial derivative with respect to ￿￿ is ambiguous to be sure, but we would argue that the composition of
the Home consumption basket may be an insu¢ cient yardstick on which to measure the likely impact of
foreign slack on the U.S. Phillips curve and the ￿ attening/steepening of the relationship.
We also argue that our results are consistent with the workhorse New Open-Economy Macro model and
robust to alternative assumptions on international pricing behavior (either the PCP or the LCP assump-
tions). Obviously, we cannot infer from our analysis that this is the better way to establish a relationship
between domestic in￿ ation and global slack. On the one hand, the model can be misspeci￿ed simply because
the assumptions of nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition on the supply side on which the model
is predicated might be a very rough approximation of the price-setting dynamics at the ￿rm level. On the
other hand, there are a number of other channels through which foreign economic activity may matter for
domestic in￿ ation that are absent from the model outlined above, such as trade in intermediate goods and
commodities, and immigration and outsourcing practices. However, this simple model can still be useful
as a benchmark to guide empirical research on testing the global slack hypothesis and as a useful starting
point from where to begin investigating the analytical content of the hypothesis.
2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE GLOBAL SLACK HYPOTHESIS
There has already been a signi￿cant amount of empirical work looking at the impact of globalization
on in￿ ation and at the impact of foreign economic activity in particular. Orr (1994) was one of the earliest
attempts to evaluate the likely restraining e⁄ect of greater slack overseas on U.S. in￿ ation. Orr focused on
imports from the other members of the Group of Seven (G-7) countries, which at the time he was writing,
accounted for over half of U.S. imports. Orr found that despite the restraining e⁄ect of excess capacity
overseas on producer-level in￿ ation in these trading partners in the early 1990s, it did not translate into
signi￿cantly lower prices for U.S. imports from these countries, primarily due to o⁄setting movements in
exchange rates. Garner (1994) also investigated the possible impact of the greater openness of the U.S.
economy on simple Phillips curve relationships between U.S. in￿ ation and domestic capacity utilization but
found no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect of the trade share. He also looked at the e⁄ect of foreign capacity
utilization, proxying it by capacity utilization in Canada since it is the largest trading partner of the U.S.,
but again found no e⁄ect.
Tootell (1998) conducted a more comprehensive assessment of whether resource utilization in the G-7
countries matters for U.S. in￿ ation. Tootell￿ s point of departure was to ask whether globalization could
account for the ￿missing in￿ ation￿ in the U.S. in the late 1990s, and he used a traditional backward-
looking Phillips curve speci￿cation to address this question. Tootell found no evidence that foreign slack
(as measured by the deviation of unemployment in the other G-7 countries from estimates of the natural
rates in those countries) mattered for U.S. in￿ ation, at least through the middle of 1996, when his sample
period ended. Wynne and Kersting (2007) attempted to replicate Tootell￿ s ￿ndings using a similar sample
period and also reported the results of simply extending the sample period to include the past decade. When
they extended the sample period, they found that the estimated coe¢ cient on the domestic slack variable
declined in magnitude and statistical signi￿cance (as many other studies have shown), while that on the
foreign slack variable increased. Global slack, at least in the other G-7 countries, seems to matter for U.S.
in￿ ation even though the evidence remains incomplete and mixed.
Much of the recent debate about the implications of globalization for in￿ ation stems from the widely
cited paper of Borio and Filardo (2007), which examined whether global slack may play a greater role in
the determination of domestic in￿ ation than domestic slack. Rather than employ a labor-market-based
measure of slack, they use a measure based on the deviation of aggregate output from potential and broaden
the de￿nition of ￿foreign￿to include not just the other members of the G-7, but several of the other top
trading partners of the U.S. as well. They found a statistically signi￿cant role for the foreign output gap in
explaining in￿ ation in the U.S., and a declining role for the domestic output gap. Subsequent research by














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
problems with the empirical analysis of Borio and Filardo: ￿rst, their de￿nition of the dependent variable
in their regressions as the di⁄erence between headline consumer price in￿ ation and trend core in￿ ation;
and second, their measurement of in￿ ation as the four-quarter change in the price index rather than the
annualized quarterly change in the price index.8
The model presented above suggests that the global slack hypothesis has analytical content, but it is
equally clear that the empirical literature has failed to ￿nd a robust relationship between in￿ ation in the
U.S. and measures of foreign slack. There are a number of reasons for this, including the possibility that
the reduced-form empirical models that have been estimated are not well speci￿ed or su⁄er from omitted
variable bias (when the model does not fully account for other channels or all the relevant variables). Part
of the empirical work to date has relied on traditional backward-looking speci￿cations of the Phillips curve
relationship of the form
￿t = ￿0 +
Xk
i=1 ￿i￿t￿i + ￿b yt + ￿￿b y￿
t + ￿(L)Zt + ￿t; (37)




expected in￿ ation, b yt and b y￿
t denote measures of domestic and foreign slack, respectively, and Zt is a vector
of other explanatory variables.
In addition, there is an element of arbitrariness to the measurement of the cyclical components of
statistical series, and there are also well-known end-of-sample problems that may be particularly important
for the short post-1990 sample period for which the coverage of most measures of global slack becomes more
complete. Also, measuring resource utilization, slack, or output gaps is challenging at the best of times.
For the emerging market economies that are believed to play an increasing role in the dynamics of U.S.
in￿ ation, data on aggregate activity are problematic, and traditional measures of resource utilization such
as unemployment rates or capacity utilization rates in manufacturing are either not available or have very
short histories.
Measurement Error and Endogeneity
There is a deeper conceptual problem hidden in the existing empirical literature based on reduced-form
regressions as those in (37). It is not clear what the relationship is between the measures of slack that
have been employed in empirical analysis and the measures suggested by the modern literature on monetary
theory. The gap concept in the model outlined above was the deviation of output from its potential (or
frictionless) level. It is intuitive that the potential level of output in such a model will look a lot di⁄erent to
the sort of smoothed estimate of trend or potential output generated by the statistical ￿ltering or production
function approaches to estimating output gaps. Indeed, Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Neiss and Nelson (2005)
show that there is a negative relationship between the New Open-Economy Macro concept of the output gap
(the deviation of output from its potential or frictionless level) and the measure commonly used in empirical
research (the deviation of output from a smooth, possibly time-varying, trend), albeit in a closed-economy
framework.
By way of illustrating the relevance of the di⁄erence between the two concepts of potential output, we
simulated the log-linearized model under the producer currency pricing (PCP) assumption as described in
Table A6 of the appendix. In this setup, each country is fully described with two exogenous shocks￿ a
productivity shock and a monetary policy shock￿ and three structural equations: an aggregate demand
(AD) equation that ties the output gap to domestic and foreign real interest rates, an aggregate supply
(AS) equation in the form of a Phillips curve that ties in￿ ation to domestic and foreign output gaps, and
￿nally a monetary policy rule in the spirit of Taylor (1993).
We set the structural parameters at ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = ’ = 5, ￿ = 1:5, ￿ = 0:94, and ￿ = 0:75. These
parametric choices are taken from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and are very similar to the closed-
economy model set-up of Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Neiss and Nelson (2005). Countries are assumed to
be of equal size, i.e., n = 1
2, and symmetric in their allocation of consumption between local goods and
8Measuring in￿ation as a four-quarter change in a quarterly price index creates overlapping observations that induce serial
correlation in the error term in a regression. Serially correlated disturbances will lead to unbiased but ine¢ cient parameter
estimates.
9If we are looking at the cyclical component of in￿ation, then ￿t must be replaced by b ￿t in equation (37). Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2008), for instance, emphasize the importance of controlling for changes in trend in￿ation when looking at the
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imported goods, i.e., (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿.10 We assume that the Taylor rule is inertial and takes in both countries
the values estimated for the U.S. by Rudebusch (2006), i.e., ￿ = 0:78,  ￿ = 1:33, and  x = 1:29. For the
AR(1) productivity shock process, we follow Kehoe and Perri (2002) in setting ￿a = 0:95 and ￿a = 0:7
for the persistence and volatility, while we set the correlation between domestic and foreign innovations at
￿"a;"a￿ = 0:25 as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002). For the AR(1) monetary shock process, we follow
Rudebusch (2006) in setting ￿m = 0 and ￿m = 0:38 for the persistence and volatility, while we set the
correlation between domestic and foreign monetary innovations at ￿"m;"m￿ = 0:5 as in Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2002). Otherwise, monetary and productivity innovations are assumed to be uncorrelated.
Then, we simulate the model under this parameterization and compute the potential level of output
consistent with the model and the trend output as measured by the application of the Hodrick￿ Prescott
(HP) ￿lter (￿ = 1;600) to the output series generated by the model for a subsample of 160 periods. Figure
1 is an illustrative scatter plot of the two series of the foreign gap for a standard sample of 160 periods. The
correlation between the two series in this plot is only 0:08, the standard deviation of the model-consistent
foreign output gap is 0:23 and the standard deviation of the HP-￿ltered output gap is 0:73. Keeping the
parameter values unchanged and simulating the model 500 times (each time extracting a subsample of 160
periods), we ￿nd that the average correlation between the foreign output gap and the HP-￿ltered foreign
output is only 0:08 (with a standard deviation of 0:11). The average volatility of the model-consistent
foreign output gap is merely 0:26 (with a standard deviation of 0:02) compared against a signi￿cantly larger
standard deviation of 0:62 (with a standard deviation of 0:06) for the HP-￿ltered foreign output￿ which
arises because the HP-￿ltered trend is too smooth relative to the model-implied potential output.
Figure 1: Comparison of Model-Consistent and Statistical Measures of the Foreign Output Gap











Correlation btw. ˆ x∗ and ˆ yhp∗ = 0.080033
Std. deviation of ˆ x∗ = 0.23365, std. deviation of ˆ yhp∗ = 0.72745





















































To further illustrate the problems these conceptual di⁄erences add to the evaluation of the global slack
hypothesis, we run a series of reduced-form regressions similar to those commonly found in the existing
10We assume that households in each country include the same share of locally produced goods and imported goods in their
respective consumption baskets (see, e.g., Warnock 2003). We denote ￿ the share of the Home goods in the Home consumption
basket and (1 ￿ ￿￿) the share of the Foreign goods in the Foreign basket. In general, accounting for the fact that the population
size of each country can be di⁄erent, our assumption requires that n(1 ￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ n)￿￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿￿ only if both countries
are symmetric (i.e., n = 1
2). In contrast, Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Woodford (2010)￿ among others￿ make the














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
empirical literature (as summarized in equation (37)) on arti￿cial data generated by our model. Speci￿cally,
we estimate two simple linear speci￿cations of the following form,
b ￿t = a￿b ￿t￿1 + axb xt + ax￿b x￿
t + ￿t; (38)
and
b ￿t = b￿b ￿t￿1 + byhpb y
hp
t + byhp￿b y
hp￿
t + vt; (39)
where b ￿t denotes domestic (cyclical) in￿ ation, b xt denotes the domestic output gap implied by the model, b x￿
t
denotes the model-consistent foreign output gap, b y
hp
t denotes the domestic HP-￿ltered output, b y
hp￿
t denotes
the foreign HP-￿ltered output, and ￿t and vt are the error terms in each reduced-form regression. The
reduced-form coe¢ cients of interest are a￿, ax, and ax￿, while b￿, byhp, and byhp￿ are the coe¢ cients on the
regression where HP-￿ltered output is used in place of the model-consistent output gap measures.
We simulate the full model 500 times and select 160 periods (approximately the equivalent of 40 years
of quarterly data) on each draw of the simulation. We then run the OLS regression on each of the simulated
time series for the chosen 160-period subsample. When we measure domestic and foreign slack using the
model-consistent output gaps, we obtain the histogram in Figure 2 for the estimated coe¢ cients a￿, ax, and
ax￿ of the regression in (38).
Figure 2: Histogram of the OLS Regression Estimates Over 500 Simulations, with Domestic and Foreign
Output Gaps


























Estimated ˆ aπ values
Mean ˆ aπ = 0.39251
Std. deviation of ˆ aπ = 0.09418


























Estimated ˆ ax values
Mean ˆ ax = 1.2953
Std. deviation of ˆ ax = 0.090264



























Estimated ˆ ax∗ values
Mean ˆ ax∗ = 0.44512
Std. deviation of ˆ ax∗ = 0.085018
The key point to note here is that when we measure the domestic and foreign output gaps in a model-
consistent manner (that is, as deviations of actual output from its potential or frictionless level), the es-
timated reduced-form coe¢ cients on domestic and foreign slack are all positive and often signi￿cantly so.
Figure 2 also shows that the coe¢ cient on domestic slack estimated in this way should be larger than the
coe¢ cient on foreign slack, but the latter is still well above the share of imported goods in the domestic
consumption basket, (1 ￿ ￿), which in our benchmark parameterization stands at 0:06. While not reported
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the estimated coe¢ cient on the domestic output gap while at the same time it increases the coe¢ cient on
the foreign output gap.11
However, if instead we attempt to evaluate the global slack hypothesis in the simulated data using
conventional statistical measures of the output gaps (i.e., deviations from smooth HP-trends), we obtain
the histogram shown in Figure 3. Note that the coe¢ cients on domestic and foreign slack are now typically
close to zero and often of the wrong sign.
Figure 3: Histogram of the OLS Regression Estimates Over 500 Simulations, with HP-Filtered Domestic
and Foreign Output


























Estimated ˆ bπ values
Mean ˆ bπ = 0.68182
Std. deviation of ˆ bπ = 0.084935




























Estimated ˆ byhp values
Mean ˆ byhp = -0.02259
Std. deviation of ˆ byhp = 0.050219





























Estimated ˆ byhp∗ values
Mean ˆ byhp∗ = -0.034934
Std. deviation of ˆ byhp∗ = 0.044187
Thus, even if the data were generated by a model wherein the global slack hypothesis made sense,
traditional reduced-form econometric methods that relied on statistical measures of the output gaps would
likely ￿nd mixed evidence in support of the hypothesis. In practice, output gaps are measured with error
because potential output is not directly observed and the statistical ￿ltering methods often produce trend
estimates that are only weakly correlated with potential output. In other words, what we observe is not
the vector of output gaps needed to estimate (38), de￿ned as b Xt = (b xt; b x￿
t)T, but the vector of HP-￿ltered










. We postulate that the observable vector b Y
hp
t is related to the
unobservable vector b Xt as follows:
b Y
hp
t = ￿ b Xt + Ut; (40)
where Ut = (ut;u￿





is the matrix of
coe¢ cients that capture the strength of the correlation between the unobservable and observable variables.
We assume the o⁄-diagonal terms to be zero for simplicity of exposition.
11Whenever ￿ = 0:82, the average of the coe¢ cient on lagged in￿ation, a￿, barely changes from 0:39 under the benchmark
parameterization to 0:38 (with a standard deviation of 0:09 across all 500 Monte Carlo simulations). The average of the
coe¢ cient on the domestic gap, ax, drops from 1:30 under the benchmark parameterization to 1:09 (with a standard deviation
of 0:07), while the average of the coe¢ cient on the foreign gap increases from 0:45 under the benchmark parameterization to
0:66 (with a standard deviation of 0:07). Moreover, we also observe that the correlation between the model-consistent foreign
output gap and the HP-￿ltered foreign output also increases from 0:08 under the benchmark parameterization to 0:25 (with a














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   





= 0. Operating with the equations in (38) and (40), it follows that
b ￿t = a￿b ￿t￿1 + b XT
t a + ￿t


























= a￿b ￿t￿1 + ax (#)￿1 b y
hp
t + ax￿ (#￿)￿1 b y
hp￿
t + vt; (41)
where vt = ￿t ￿ UT
t
￿
￿T￿￿1 a = ￿t ￿ ax (#)￿1 ut ￿ ax￿ (#￿)￿1 u￿
t de￿nes the error term. From (41), the
mapping between the coe¢ cients of interest a￿ and a ￿ (ax;ax￿)T in (38) and the coe¢ cients in (39) for




can be established as







ax (#)￿1 ;ax￿ (#￿)￿1
￿T
; (43)
which implies that the matrix ￿ has to be pinned down before we can infer the coe¢ cient vector a from the
estimates of the vector b.
For simplicity, let us assume that b￿ = a￿ is known and move the corresponding lagged in￿ ation term































a 6= 0; (44)
which would result in an endogeneity problem if b =
￿





6= 0. It follows that if b b
is the OLS estimate of the vector b, then it will not be a consistent estimator, i.e.,
b b
p












b 6= b: (45)
Measurement error bias will distort the estimates on these reduced-form regressions. However, that is not
the only concern that arises from our discussion so far. First, even with a consistent estimator for b, in
order to recover a we would also need to identify ￿. Second, the exogeneity of equation (38) is in question
too because the residuals ￿t can be expressed as a function of current (and perhaps lagged) shocks which





either, and simple OLS estimates of (38) may not necessarily produce unbiased estimators even if we are
able to observe the model-consistent output gaps collected in the vector b Xt.
Choice of Regressors and Multicollinearity
In light of the conceptual and measurement challenges associated with estimating open-economy Phillips
curves in terms of domestic and foreign output gaps, it is worth asking whether we can derive alternative
speci￿cations that rely on more easily measured variables such as the terms of trade. Under the producer
currency pricing (PCP) assumption, it is possible to write the terms of trade gap b zt ￿ (c tott ￿ c tott) as a









(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
3
5(b xt ￿ b x￿
t): (46)
Using this expression to eliminate the foreign output gap term from the Phillips curve in equation (20)
above, we obtain that
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿
￿
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> > > > > <
> > > > > :





(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(’(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)); if ￿ 6= ￿￿;
or
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(’ + ￿); if ￿ = ￿￿:
(48)
That is, in principle the e⁄ects of foreign slack on domestic in￿ ation can be fully captured by movements in
the terms of trade gap. Note that the slope of the Phillips curve with respect to domestic slack, ￿(’ + ￿),
is exactly the same in the open-economy and closed-economy speci￿cations whenever the open-economy
version includes the terms of trade gap instead of the foreign output gap.12









(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
￿
; (49)
where the composite coe¢ cient ￿￿;x￿ is de￿ned in (22) and the term within square brackets is shown to
be positive for the entire parameter space in the appendix. Therefore, the sign of ￿￿;z is determined by
the sign of ￿￿;x￿. As discussed extensively in the appendix, ￿￿;x￿ is always positive if we assume identical
consumption baskets as Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Woodford (2010) do, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿. However,
in the general case where ￿ 6= ￿￿, we cannot rule out the possibility that ￿￿;x￿ becomes negative in some
range of the parameter space. Therefore, while in most instances the terms of trade gap enters with a
negative coe¢ cient, we cannot exclude the possibility that the sign might also turn positive in some region
of the parameter space. The absolute value of this coe¢ cient depends on the shares of Home goods in the
consumption baskets, 0 < ￿ < 1 and 0 < ￿￿ < 1, the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign
goods, ￿ > 0, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿ > 0, and the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, ’ > 0.
If instead we assume local currency pricing (LCP), the relationship between the terms of trade gap and
the output gaps in the Home and Foreign countries must include a term accounting for deviations from the









(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
3











(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
3
5 b dt: (50)
This relationship depends exclusively on deviations from the law of one price for Foreign goods in the
domestic market, b dt, because in our framework it can be shown that
￿
b pF










turn that implies b dt = ￿b d￿
t (see, e.g., Engel 2009). Moreover, we can derive from the de￿nition of the real
exchange rate and the consumption price indexes in both countries the following relationship:
b rst = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)c tott ￿ (1 + (￿ ￿ ￿￿))b dt: (51)
In the frictionless equilibrium with ￿ exible prices, expression (51) reduces to b rst = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)c tott. Hence, we
can rewrite the open-economy Phillips curve in terms of the domestic output gap, the terms of trade gap,
and the real exchange rate (net of terms of trade e⁄ects) as
b ￿t = ￿Et (b ￿t+1) + ￿[(’ + ￿)b xt + ￿￿;zb zt ￿ ￿￿(b rst ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿)c tott)]; (52)














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
where the composite parameter ￿￿;z is de￿ned as in (48) and ￿￿ is expressed as
￿￿ ￿
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
￿




























; if ￿ 6= ￿￿;
or
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ’)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ n); if ￿ = ￿￿:
(53)
The composite parameters on the domestic output gap and the terms of trade gap are the same as un-
der producer currency pricing (PCP), as can be observed by comparing equations (47) and (52). Most
signi￿cantly, the responsiveness of CPI in￿ ation to the domestic output gap is exactly the same as in the
closed-economy case. If we make the additional assumption that the consumption baskets are identical (as
do Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler 2002 and Woodford 2010), i.e., ￿ = ￿￿, then the real exchange rate su¢ ces to
summarize the contribution of the deviations of the law of one price. Even in that special case, however,
the sign of ￿￿ can be positive or negative in di⁄erent ranges of the parameter space and depends crucially
on the domestic population size, 0 < n < 1, among other structural parameters.
Thus there is an equivalence between expressing the open-economy Phillips curve in terms of domestic
and foreign output gaps and expressing it in terms of the domestic output gap, the terms of trade gap,
and the real exchange rate (net of terms of trade e⁄ects). To the extent that the traditional Phillips curve
literature has included variables such as oil and commodity prices (whose movements are highly correlated
with the U.S. terms of trade) or the real exchange rate as right-hand-side variables since the 1970s, global
slack has been noted and accounted for implicitly as an important determinant of U.S. in￿ ation for a long
time. More recently, Ihrig et al. (2007) speci￿ed the in￿ ation equation as a function of lagged in￿ ation;
domestic and foreign slack; and import, energy, and food prices.
However, while terms of trade data are more readily available in countries like the U.S., we must note
that the open-economy Phillips curve is de￿ned as a function of a terms of trade gap rather than terms
of trade alone. Therefore, the proper measurement of potential (or frictionless) terms of trade remains a
signi￿cant concern and a source of measurement error bias.
Theory suggests that the coe¢ cient on the domestic output gap is invariant to changes in the domestic
and foreign consumption baskets whenever we properly account for movements in the U.S. terms of trade
gap, which would imply that the stability of the slope coe¢ cient on domestic slack cannot be necessarily
interpreted as evidence against the global slack hypothesis. If anything, one would expect greater open-
ness and concurrent changes in the consumption baskets to translate solely into changes on the composite
coe¢ cient on the terms of trade gap.
In the context of our model, adding a terms of trade gap into a reduced-form regression where do-
mestic and foreign output gaps are also included as explanatory variables could result in a severe case of
multicollinearity. The implication of strict or near multicollinearity is that individual coe¢ cients will be
imprecisely estimated. In other words, when the terms of trade gap is highly dependent on other regressors
(the domestic and foreign output gaps in our model), then it is statistically di¢ cult to disentangle the im-
pact of the coe¢ cient estimates. However, the greater imprecision in the estimation will be re￿ ected in large
standard errors and should imply that inference is undistorted even in the presence of multicollinearity.
Let us again focus our attention on the workhorse model under producer currency pricing (PCP) de-
scribed in Table A6 in the appendix. Equation (46) under PCP hints already that multicollinearity problems
are a distinct possibility since the terms of trade gap is linearly dependent on both domestic and foreign
output gaps. Multicollinearity may not be averted by excluding in the reduced-form regressions either the
measure of the terms of trade gap or the measure of the foreign output gap. To elaborate on this point, we
replace the reduced-form regression in (38) with this alternative speci￿cation including the terms of trade
gap as de￿ned in (46), i.e.,
b ￿t ￿ a￿b ￿t￿1 = axb xt + azb zt + ￿z
t; (54)
where we assume that a￿ is known and that only the vector az ￿ (ax;az)T needs to be estimated. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the errors in the reduced-form regression are homoskedastic, i.e., ￿2
￿z.
If the regression errors were in fact heteroskedastic, then it is possible that the covariance matrix for the
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We de￿ne c Wt = (b xt;b zt)T to be the vector of regressors, denote N to be the sample size, and normalize
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where we characterize the volatility of the terms of trade gap, e ￿2
z, and the correlation of the terms of trade
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In the hypothetical case under homoskedasticity, the covariance matrix of the OLS estimates b az takes
the relatively simple form
V
￿



































which is known up to the unknown scaling factor ￿2
￿z. There are a number of alternative estimators for
￿2
￿z that can be considered, but what matters to illustrate multicollinearity is that we cannot rule out





t will become near singular. In this particular scenario,
multicollinearity is closely tied to the coe¢ cient of correlation between domestic and foreign output gaps,





(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿) = 2, we can easily observe that the variance of the OLS
estimates V
￿
b az j c W
￿
approaches in￿nity as e ￿x;x￿ approaches ￿1. While this is not a general statement about
the model, it indicates that multicollinearity problems and imprecision in the estimates can still hamper the
interpretation of these reduced-form regressions even if one is careful about the choice of regressors (and
even if one is able to maneuver around the conceptual and measurement challenges that the gap concept
poses).
13Under the inherent symmetry of the model, we know that the population variance of the domestic and foreign output















































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
A similar thought experiment can be conducted with the reduced-form regression in (38), where the
covariance matrix of the OLS estimates b a under homoskedasticity is given by
V
￿



































which is known up to the unknown scaling factor ￿2
￿. Near singularity arises whenever ￿xx￿ approaches
1. In most of our simulations, the coe¢ cient of correlation between the domestic and foreign output gaps
appears to be very low and close to zero,14 which suggests that multicollinearity is not a major problem
in the reduced-form regressions we run on data generated from our model. However, the high correlation
between certain domestic measures and foreign measures of slack (e.g., capacity utilization rates in the U.S.
and the rest of the G-7 seem to move in tandem most of the time) raises the prospect of multicollinearity
in empirical work. Still, there are episodes where the divergence between domestic and foreign measures
might alleviate these concerns. In fact, it was the striking discrepancy between capacity utilization rates in
the U.S. and the rest of the G-7 in the early 1990s that motivated the analysis of Orr (1994).
Ultimately, our analysis tells us that the validity of the global slack hypothesis cannot be determined
solely on the basis of simple least squares regressions on reduced-form relationships of the sort reported
elsewhere in the empirical literature. A fuller evaluation of the global slack hypothesis would likely require
a more structural approach to the multiple factors and diverse channels in￿ uencing in￿ ation dynamics in
the open economy that can be taken to the data. We leave that for future research.
3. CONCLUSION
Our objective in this paper has been to show that the global slack hypothesis has analytical content in
the context of at least one widely used framework for thinking about in￿ ation trade-o⁄s in open economies.
Under most possible parameterizations, we have shown that in theory in￿ ation is less responsive to domestic
slack the more exposed a country is to international trade. We have also shown that foreign slack does matter
for domestic in￿ ation when a country is engaged in international trade, and the importance of foreign slack
increases as the domestic share of consumption devoted to foreign-produced goods increases in most cases.
We ￿nd, however, that the importance of foreign slack may either increase or decline in response to changes
in the foreign share of consumption devoted to domestically-produced goods depending on how open the
domestic economy is.
We also noted the conceptual and statistical di¢ culties of measuring the output gaps and suggested
that terms of trade (and other international relative prices) may account for some of the foreign in￿ uences
on domestic in￿ ation and, therefore, allow us to bypass some of those measurement and data availability
problems associated with the output gap measures￿ without being exempt from the same sort of conceptual
problems. A fuller evaluation of the global slack hypothesis would complete and extend the speci￿cation of
the model outlined above, and then would take the full system to the data.
There are several avenues for further research. On the theory side, there are many potential additional
channels through which foreign factors might have an impact on domestic in￿ ation developments that would
be worth modelling. Two that spring to mind are migration and international trade in raw materials and
intermediate inputs. Leith and Malley (2007) and Rumler (2007) have investigated the basic model sketched
out above allowing for trade in intermediate inputs. Recent work by Lach (2007), Cortes (2008), Razin and
Binyamini (2007), Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno (2008) and Engler (2009) has shown how the presence of
large immigrant populations can impact domestic prices. And the surge in global commodity prices in 2007
and 2008 was a reminder of how price dynamics at all stages of the production chain have been impacted
by the shifting distribution of global economic activity.
The model we sketched out is not well suited to address questions of deep structural change that are
arguably at the heart of the debate about the implications of globalization for in￿ ation and monetary
14Keeping our benchmark parameterization unchanged and simulating the model 500 times (each time extracting a sub-
sample of 160 periods), we ￿nd that the average correlation coe¢ cient between the model-consistent domestic and foreign
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policy, and therein lies another potentially fruitful avenue for future research. In our work, we argued that
it is important to abstract from ￿ uctuations in trend when evaluating the global slack hypothesis, but our
theory has little to say about these changes in trend, or whether they might have implications for short-run
dynamics. The literature that addresses the potential impact of globalization on trend in￿ ation that began
with Romer (1993) has largely focused on explaining the role of openness in accounting for cross-country














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
APPENDIX
In the general case, the composite coe¢ cients ￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿ a⁄ecting the slope of the Phillips curve
relationship described in equations (20), (31) and (36) can be written as in (21) and (22), where the term
within parentheses is a rather intimidating expression involving many of the structural parameters of the
model￿ including the share of the Home goods in the Home consumption basket, 0 < ￿ < 1, and the share of
the Home goods in the Foreign basket, 0 < ￿￿ < 1. Under the assumption of identical consumption baskets
in both countries (i.e., ￿ = ￿￿) investigated by Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Woodford (2010), the
coe¢ cients in (21) and (22) simplify to
￿￿;x = ￿ (￿ + ’) > 0;
￿￿;x￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ’) > 0:
The same expressions can be derived whenever ￿ = 1
￿ without having to impose the assumption of identical
consumption baskets. In these two special cases, the foreign output gap will matter for domestic CPI
in￿ ation, and there is no ambiguity about the sign of the e⁄ect. The importance of the foreign output gap
is unequivocally greater, the greater the share of foreign goods in the Home consumption basket, (1 ￿ ￿).
We illustrate with this appendix how the sign of the composite coe¢ cients and their sensitivity to the
shares ￿ and ￿￿ cannot be asserted uniquely across all possible combinations of the parameter space except
in special cases.
The Sign of the Coe¢ cients on the Phillips Curve
The sign of the coe¢ cients on the domestic and foreign output gaps in the open-economy Phillips curve
is given by the sign of ￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿ in (21) and (22), which is not going to be positive across all possible
combinations of values in the parameter space. The denominator of the expression within parentheses is





n(1 ￿ n)(￿ ￿ ￿￿)2
(1 ￿ n)￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) + n￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
!
:
It follows that the term within parentheses in the right-hand side of this inequality constraint is positive.
Any combination of the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿ > 0, and the elasticity of
substitution between the Home and Foreign bundles of varieties, ￿ > 0, satis￿es that inequality. Therefore,
the numerator in both cases is what ultimately determines the sign of the coe¢ cients in the Phillips curve.
For the composite coe¢ cient ￿￿;x, we observe that the numerator of the expression within parentheses






(1 ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 ￿ n)￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) + n￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
If the share of Home goods is larger in the Foreign basket than in the Home basket, i.e., ￿￿ > ￿, then
the right-hand-side term of the constraint is positive and there is some combination of the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿ > 0, and the elasticity of substitution between the Home and
Foreign bundles, ￿ > 0, for which the numerator becomes negative. In that case, we cannot rule out the
possibility that for some values of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ’ > 0, the composite
coe¢ cient ￿￿;x may become negative as well.
Similarly for the composite coe¢ cient ￿￿;x￿, we observe that the numerator of the expression within







(1 ￿ n)￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿) + n￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
If the share of Home goods is larger in the Home basket than in the Foreign basket, i.e., ￿ > ￿￿, then
the right-hand-side term of the constraint is positive and there is some combination of the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿ > 0, and the elasticity of substitution between the Home and
Foreign bundles of varieties, ￿ > 0, for which the numerator becomes negative. In that case, we cannot
rule out the possibility that for some values of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ’ > 0,
the composite coe¢ cient ￿￿;x￿ may become negative too. However, while our ￿ndings suggest that the
composite coe¢ cients ￿￿;x and ￿￿;x￿ can become negative in some cases, it cannot happen that both
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The Sensitivity of the Coe¢ cients on the Phillips Curve
The sensitivity of the Phillips curve coe¢ cients to changes in the consumption basket shares is also
di⁄erent across regions of the parameter space. We can interpret the share of Home goods in the Home
basket, 0 < ￿ < 1, as a reciprocal measure of greater openness or integration with the Foreign economy. The
larger the share ￿, the more biased Home consumption is toward the Home-produced goods and, hence, the
less open￿ and subject to￿ foreign in￿ uences is the domestic Phillips curve.
One way to assess the sensitivity of the slope of the Phillips curve to changes in ￿ is to compute the
partial derivative of the coe¢ cient ￿￿;x￿ assuming that all other structural parameters are unchanged.15














= ￿(￿ + ’) < 0:
The signs of these partial derivatives are unambiguous; if the world economy becomes more oriented toward
Home goods, then the Home output gap should matter more and the Foreign output gap less for the domestic
Phillips curve ceteris paribus. However, the implicit assumption in these calculations is that the share of
Home goods in the Home consumption basket, ￿, and the share of Home goods in the Foreign basket, ￿￿,
are moving in the same direction and by the same amount to preserve the identity between the Home
and Foreign consumption baskets. In other words, these partial derivatives re￿ ect the marginal e⁄ect of a
simultaneous marginal change in the shares of both countries.
When we investigate the more general setting￿ without identical consumption baskets￿ and ask what
happens to the Phillips curve coe¢ cients when ￿ changes marginally but not any other of the structural
parameters (including ￿￿), then the answer is no longer as straightforward. In computing the corresponding
partial derivative for ￿￿;x￿, we obtain that
@￿￿;x￿
@￿




























and ￿ > ￿￿;
> 0 otherwise;






(￿ ￿ ￿￿)(￿ ￿ ￿￿) > 0;
￿0





















n(1 ￿ n)((2(1 ￿ ￿￿) ￿ n(1 + 2(￿ ￿ ￿￿)))￿￿ + n￿)
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(￿ ￿ ￿￿) > 0;
> 0 otherwise.























@￿￿ su¢ ces to characterize the response of














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
be either positive or negative, therefore potentially a⁄ecting the sign of the partial derivative. We ￿nd that







< 0 if ￿ < 1
￿;
> 0 if ￿ > 1
￿;













> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :





















The standard intuition is that an increase in the domestic share ￿, which implies a decline in the share of
imported goods in the Home consumption basket (1 ￿ ￿), should result in a lower coe¢ cient on the foreign
output gap, i.e.,
@￿￿;x￿
@￿ < 0. What our analysis suggests is otherwise since sensitivity of the coe¢ cient on
the foreign output gap is certainly more complicated and highly nonlinear than this simple intuition would
















which￿ for any given combination of 0 < ￿ < 1 and 0 < ￿￿ < 1￿ is a possibility that cannot be ruled out
in some range of the parameter space formed by the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
￿ > 0, the elasticity of substitution between the Home and Foreign bundles of varieties, ￿ > 0, and the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ’ > 0.
To investigate the ambiguity on the sign of the partial derivative, we evaluate it ￿rst under our bench-
mark parameterization but allowing for the elasticity of substitution ￿ > 0 and the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply ’ > 0 to span a range of values in their parameter space. Countries are assumed
to be of equal size, i.e., n = 1
2, we evaluate the Home good shares, ￿ and ￿￿, at 0:94 and 0:06 respectively as
in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿,
at 5. The region in which the partial derivative turns positive is (vanishingly) small and requires very low
values of the elasticity of substitution ￿ and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ’.16 In other
words, for most parameterizations it seems reasonable to assume that the derivative would still be negative.
We repeat the same exercise by setting a lower domestic share of ￿ = 0:82 and a higher foreign import
share of ￿￿ = 0:18 and plot the positive and negative regions in Figure A1. The size of the region where the
partial derivative is positive is sensitive to the parameterization of the shares and larger than it would have
been under our benchmark parameterization. In fact, for plausible values of the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, ￿ > 0, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ’ > 0, we ￿nd that
the partial derivative turns positive only if we are willing to assume a low enough elasticity of substitution
between the Home and Foreign bundles of varieties, ￿ > 0, well below one.
It has often been argued that the import share in the U.S. is relatively small compared with that of
other countries and that it has not increased by that much. However, calculations such as the ones we have
conducted so far say little about what happens to the coe¢ cients of the domestic Phillips curve if, in fact,
the rest of the world is the one that becomes more open toward the Home economy. Can we still claim that
the limited size of the import share in the U.S. is insulating us from foreign forces as well as in the past?
To assess that point, we can take the partial derivative of the slope coe¢ cient of the domestic Phillips
curve with respect to the share of imports of Home goods in the Foreign consumption basket, 0 < ￿￿ < 1.
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and ￿ > ￿￿;
> 0 otherwise,














(1 ￿ n)(n￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ((1 ￿ n)￿￿ + n￿)￿￿)






> 0 if ￿ > 1











> 0 if ￿ < 1


















n(1 ￿ n)((1 + n(1 ￿ 2￿))￿ + (1 ￿ n)(1 ￿ 2￿)￿￿)
￿












(￿ ￿ ￿￿) > 0;
< 0 otherwise,
whose sign is￿ once again￿ rather ambiguous.
To illustrate the fact that the sign of this partial derivative can be either positive or negative, we
numerically calculate the derivative
@￿￿;x￿
@￿￿ under our benchmark parameterization but allowing for the
elasticity of substitution between the Home and Foreign bundles of varieties, ￿ > 0, and the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ￿ > 0, to span a range of values in their parameter space. In
Figure A2 countries are assumed to be of equal size, i.e., n = 1
2, and we evaluate the Home good shares, ￿
and ￿￿, at 0:94 and 0:06, respectively, as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002). We ￿nd that￿ under a
conventional parameterization of the model￿ we are likely to observe a positive partial derivative in response
to a marginal increase in the share of domestic goods in the Foreign consumption basket, i.e.,
@￿￿;x￿
@￿￿ > 0.
That is, there is a wide range of values of ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 for which the partial derivative is positive.
In Figure A3 we instead evaluate the Home good shares, ￿ and ￿￿, at 0:82 and 0:18, respectively. Now
the range of values of ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0 for which the derivative is positive is a lot smaller than it is under
the parameterization of the shares in Figure A2. The interpretation of this result suggests that one should
not rule out the possibility that the slope coe¢ cient on the foreign output gap may increase whenever the
rest of the world becomes more open and purchases more Home goods (￿￿ increases), even if the degree
of domestic openness measured by ￿ remains unchanged. However, whether this partial derivative takes a
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Table A1 (a) - Notation
Home
Real variables
Output of Home variety h Yt(h)
Potential output of Home variety h Y t(h)
Labor demand of Home variety h Lt (h)
Aggregate labor supply nLt
Consumption of Home variety h Ct(h)
Consumption of Foreign variety f Ct(f)
Nominal variables
Price of Home variety h Pt(h)
Price of Foreign variety f Pt(f)
Re-optimizing price of Home variety h e Pt(h)
Re-optimizing price of Foreign variety f e Pt(f)
Home (contingent) bonds BH ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
Foreign (contingent) bonds BF ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
Price of (contingent) bonds Q
￿
!t+1 j !t￿
Nominal exchange rate St
Pro￿ts from Home variety h ￿t (h)
Nominal wages Wt
Lump sum tax Tt
Labor wage tax (or subsidy) ￿t
Shocks
Productivity shocks At
Monetary policy shocks Mt
Useful de￿nitions









Marginal costs (pre-tax) MCt (h) = MCt ￿ Wt
At
Marginal costs (after-tax) MC
￿









Pt (h)nCt (h) + StP￿
t (h)(1 ￿ n)C￿
t (h)￿
￿(1 + ￿t)WtLt (h)
￿
dh
Aggregate output nYt ￿
R n
0 Yt (h)dh
Aggregate potential output nY t ￿
R n
0 Y t (h)dh


























































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Table A1 (b) - Notation
Foreign
Real variables
Output of Foreign variety f Y ￿
t (f)
Potential output of Foreign variety f Y
￿
t(f)
Labor demand of Foreign variety f L￿
t (f)
Aggregate labor supply (1 ￿ n)L￿
t
Consumption of Home variety h C￿
t (h)
Consumption of Foreign variety f C￿
t (f)
Nominal variables
Price of Home variety h P￿
t (h)
Price of Foreign variety f P￿
t (f)
Re-optimizing price of Home variety h e P￿
t (h)
Re-optimizing price of Foreign variety f e P￿
t (f)
Home (contingent) bonds BH￿ ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
Foreign (contingent) bonds BF￿ ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
Price of (contingent) bonds Q￿ ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
Nominal exchange rate 1
St




Lump sum tax T￿
t





Monetary policy shocks M￿
t
Useful de￿nitions
Real exchange rate 1
RSt
Terms of trade 1
ToTt
Marginal costs (pre-tax) MC￿






Marginal costs (after-tax) MC
￿￿














StPt (f)nCt (f) + P￿
































Nominal interest rates 1 + i￿
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Table A2 (a) - Firms
Home
Optimization (potential, ￿ exible prices)￿
Technology Yt (h) = AtLt (h)
Pro￿ts of ￿rm h
￿
nCd
t (h) + (1 ￿ n)Cd￿
t (h)
￿￿


































Equilibrium conditions (potential, ￿ exible prices)￿
Optimal pricing of ￿rm h





t (h) = 1
StPt (h)
Potential output of ￿rm h Y t (h) = nCd
t (h) + (1 ￿ n)Cd￿
t (h)
Optimization (PCP case)
Technology Yt (h) = AtLt (h)












t;t+￿ (h) ￿ n e Cd




























Equilibrium conditions (PCP case)
Optimal pricing of ￿rm h






















Technology Yt (h) = AtLt (h)
























Home demand constraint e Cd












Foreign demand constraint e Cd￿















Equilibrium conditions (LCP case)
Optimal pricing of ￿rm h



































* In a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbols for the variables under the potential scenario
with ￿exible prices as for the full model with nominal rigidities. We only distinguish potential output














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Table A2 (b) - Firms
Foreign
Optimization (potential, ￿ exible prices)￿
Technology Y ￿
t (f) = A￿
tL￿
t (f)
Pro￿ts of ￿rm f
￿
nCd








































Equilibrium conditions (potential, ￿ exible prices)￿
Optimal pricing of ￿rm f
P￿




Pt (f) = StP￿
t (f)
Potential output of ￿rm f Y
￿
t (f) = nCd




t (f) = A￿
tL￿
t (f)














t;t+￿ (f) ￿ n e Cd






























Equilibrium conditions (PCP case)
Optimal pricing of ￿rm f
e P￿
























t (f) = A￿
tL￿
t (f)



























Home demand constraint e Cd












Foreign demand constraint e Cd￿















Equilibrium conditions (LCP case)
Optimal pricing of ￿rm f
e P￿









































* In a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbols for the variables under the potential scenario
with ￿exible prices as for the full model with nominal rigidities. We only distinguish potential output
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Demand of Home variety h C￿
























Demand of Foreign variety f C￿
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Table A4 (a) - Policy rules, market clearing conditions, and shock processes
Home
Policy rules
Fiscal policy ￿t = ￿1
￿
Government budget constraint n[Tt + ￿tWtLt] = 0











Home variety h Yt (h) = nCt (h) + (1 ￿ n)C￿
t (h)




Home (contingent) bonds nBH ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
+ (1 ￿ n)BH￿ ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
= 0; 8!t+1 2 ￿
Shock processes








































Foreign variety f Y ￿
t (f) = nCt (f) + (1 ￿ n)C￿
t (f)






Foreign (contingent) bonds nBF ￿
!t+1 j !t￿
+ (1 ￿ n)BF￿ ￿
!t+1 j !t￿





























































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Table A5 - Model parameters
Structural parameters
Intertemporal discount factor 0 < ￿ < 1
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ￿ > 0
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ’ > 0
Elasticity of substitution across varieties within a country ￿ > 1
Elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign bundles ￿ > 0
Share of Home goods in the Home basket 0 < ￿ < 1
Share of Home goods in the Foreign basket 0 < ￿￿ < 1
Home population size, Mass of Home varieties 0 < n < 1
Foreign population size, Mass of Foreign varieties 0 < 1 ￿ n < 1
Calvo price stickiness parameter 0 < ￿ < 1
Monetary policy parameters
Monetary policy inertia 0 < ￿ < 1
Sensitivity to deviations from in￿ ation target  ￿ > 1
Sensitivity to deviations from potential output target  x > 0
Shock parameters
Persistence of the productivity shock ￿1 < ￿a < 1
Volatility of the productivity shock ￿a > 0
Correl. between Home and Foreign product. innovations ￿1 < ￿"a;"a￿ < 1
Persistence of the monetary policy shock ￿1 < ￿m < 1
Volatility of the monetary policy shock ￿m > 0
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Table A6 - Workhorse log-linearized New Open-Economy Macro model (under PCP)
Home Economy
Output gap ￿ (Et [b xt+1] ￿ b xt) ￿ ￿x;i[(b it ￿b it) ￿ Et[b ￿t+1]] ￿ ￿x;i￿[(b i￿
t ￿b i
￿
t) ￿ Et[b ￿￿
t+1]]





￿￿;xb xt + ￿￿;x￿b x￿
t
￿
Monetary policy b it ￿ ￿ib it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)[ ￿b ￿t +  xb xt] +b "m
t















e ￿ab at + e ￿a￿b a￿
t
i













￿ ￿￿x￿;i[(b it ￿b it) ￿ Et[b ￿t+1]] + ￿x￿;i￿[(b i￿
t ￿b i
￿
t) ￿ Et[b ￿￿
t+1]]











￿￿￿;xb xt + ￿￿￿;x￿b x￿
t
￿
Monetary policy b i￿
t ￿ ￿ib i￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
 ￿b ￿￿
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